ISO/IEC – Evaluation Criteria for Information Technology Security represents the The acceptance by ISO will ensure that CC rapidly becomes the world. ISO/IEC establishes the general concepts and principles of IT security evaluation and specifies the general model of evaluation given by various. COMMON CRITERIA ISO/IEC SECURITY 2. The term Common Criteria ( or CC) refers to the “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security.
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exclusive license to ISO/IEC to use CC in the continued development/ maintenance of the. ISO/IEC international standard. However. ISO/IEC. Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security —. Part 1: Introduction and general model. Protection Profile and Security Target evaluation criteria class structure. Usage of terms in ISO/IEC
Characteristics of these organizations were examined and presented at ICCC Evaluations at EAL5 and above tend to involve the security requirements of the host nation's government. In September , a majority of members of the CCRA produced a vision statement whereby mutual recognition of CC evaluated products will be lowered to EAL 2 Including augmentation with flaw remediation. Further, this vision indicates a move away from assurance levels altogether and evaluations will be confined to conformance with Protection Profiles that have no stated assurance level. This will be achieved through technical working groups developing worldwide PPs, and as yet a transition period has not been fully determined.
In July , the The Public-Key Cryptography Standards are specifications produced by RSA Laboratories in cooperation with secure systems developers worldwide for the purpose of accelerating the deployment of public-key cryptography.
First published in as a result of meetings with a small group of early adopters of public-key technology, the PKCS documents have become widely referenced and implemented. Quick Search: For Consumers, Developers, Experts. Common Criteria From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Common Criteria CC: Introduction and general model. Information technology -- Security techniques -- Evaluation criteria for IT security. Security functional requirements. Security assurance requirements.
Government initiative originated to meet the security testing needs of both information technology IT consumers and producers. By Ariffuddin Aizuddin, Government initiative. Rainbow Series From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Rainbow Series Library The Rainbow Series sometimes known as the Rainbow Books is a series of computer security standards and guidelines published by the United States government in the s and s.
They were originally published by the U. The term "Rainbow Series" comes from the fact that each book is a different color.
The main book, upon which all other expound, was the Orange Book. Note Portions of the Rainbow Series e. The Orange Book Site - Dynamoo.
Another way to view this is to consider the refinement of specifications, as shown in Figure 2, which has a waterfall-like quality. This should be done in a way that gives consideration to the mission or business, the assets requiring protection, and the purpose of the system under evaluation the TOE.
Such consistency would presumably result in more consistency in applying the Common Criteria to various TOEs. A number of recommendations toward this end have been collected in one document [ PP 02 ]. The higher the level, the more confidence you can have that the security functional requirements have been met. Applies when you require confidence in a product's correct operation, but do not view threats to security as serious. An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the target of evaluation functions in a manner consistent with its documentation and that it provides useful protection against identified threats.
EAL2: Structurally Tested.
Applies when developers or users require low to moderate independently assured security but the complete development record is not readily available. This situation may arise when there is limited developer access or when there is an effort to secure legacy systems.
Applies when developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security and require a thorough investigation of the target of evaluation and its development, without substantial reengineering.
Applies when developers or users require moderate to high independently assured security in conventional commodity products and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.
Applies when developers or users require high, independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach that does not incur unreasonable costs from specialist security engineering techniques.
Applies when developing security targets of evaluation for application in high-risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs. Applies to the development of security targets of evaluation for application in extremely high-risk situations, as well as when the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs.
Common Criteria Usage One way in which the Common Criteria can be used is in conjunction with system acquisition [ Abrams 00 ]. A mapping between CC features and system acquisition elements is shown in Table 1.
In the first row, the protection profile concept helps to identify, among other things, customer requirements. The fact that there are many protection profile templates in existence is very helpful to this part of the effort.
Major changes to the Arrangement include:. Common Criteria is very generic; it does not directly provide a list of product security requirements or features for specific classes of products: Common Criteria certification cannot guarantee security, but it can ensure that claims about the security attributes of the evaluated product were independently verified. In other words, products evaluated against a Common Criteria standard exhibit a clear chain of evidence that the process of specification, implementation, and evaluation has been conducted in a rigorous and standard manner.
Various Microsoft Windows versions, including Windows Server and Windows XP , have been certified , but security patches to address security vulnerabilities are still getting published by Microsoft for these Windows systems.
This is possible because the process of obtaining a Common Criteria certification allows a vendor to restrict the analysis to certain security features and to make certain assumptions about the operating environment and the strength of threats faced by the product in that environment.
Additionally, the CC recognizes a need to limit the scope of evaluation in order to provide cost-effective and useful security certifications, such that evaluated products are examined to a level of detail specified by the assurance level or PP.
Evaluations activities are therefore only performed to a certain depth, use of time, and resources and offer reasonable assurance for the intended environment. The TOE is applicable to networked or distributed environments only if the entire network operates under the same constraints and resides within a single management domain. There are no security requirements that address the need to trust external systems or the communications links to such systems.
Based on this and other assumptions, which may not be realistic for the common use of general-purpose operating systems, the claimed security functions of the Windows products are evaluated. Thus they should only be considered secure in the assumed, specified circumstances, also known as the evaluated configuration. Whether you run Microsoft Windows in the precise evaluated configuration or not, you should apply Microsoft's security patches for the vulnerabilities in Windows as they continue to appear.
If any of these security vulnerabilities are exploitable in the product's evaluated configuration, the product's Common Criteria certification should be voluntarily withdrawn by the vendor. Alternatively, the vendor should re-evaluate the product to include the application of patches to fix the security vulnerabilities within the evaluated configuration.
Failure by the vendor to take either of these steps would result in involuntary withdrawal of the product's certification by the certification body of the country in which the product was evaluated. This shows both the limitation and strength of an evaluated configuration. Objections outlined in the article include:. In a research paper, computer specialist David A. Wheeler suggested that the Common Criteria process discriminates against free and open-source software FOSS -centric organizations and development models.