Sobre la 'Retórica' de musicmarkup.info Uploaded by Edward Hyde. Copyright: © All Rights Reserved. Download as PDF or read online from Scribd. Flag for. Gasche Rodolphe Un Arte Muy Fragil Sobre La Retorica de Aristoteles PDF Download as PDF or read online from Scribd. Flag for inappropriate. Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic. Both alike are con- cerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no .
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Sorry, this document isn't available for viewing at this time. In the meantime, you can download the document by clicking the 'Download' button above. Title: Arte Retórica e Arte Poética - Aristóteles, Author: Minha Biblioteca, Name: Arte Retórica e Arte Poética - Aristóteles, Length: pages. His view of rhetoric was that it was only a means of persuasion, and he was careful to explain that his only object was to make his pupils skilful rhetoricians, able.
Not only authors writing in the peripatetic tradition, but also the famous Roman teachers of rhetoric, such as Cicero and Quintilian, frequently used elements stemming from the Aristotelian doctrine. Nevertheless, these authors were interested neither in an authentic interpretation of the Aristotelian works nor in the philosophical sources and backgrounds of the vocabulary that Aristotle had introduced to rhetorical theory. Thus, for two millennia the interpretation of Aristotelian rhetoric has become a matter of the history of rhetoric, not of philosophy. It was not until the last few decades that the philosophically salient features of the Aristotelian rhetoric were rediscovered: in construing a general theory of the persuasive, Aristotle applies numerous concepts and arguments that are also treated in his logical, ethical, and psychological writings. His theory of rhetorical arguments, for example, is only one further application of his general doctrine of the sullogismos, which also forms the basis of dialectic, logic, and his theory of demonstration. Another example is the concept of emotions: though emotions are one of the most important topics in the Aristotelian ethics, he nowhere offers such an illuminating account of single emotions as in the Rhetoric.
Sinto a vossa falta. Vou ouvir-vos, em especial quando discordarmos. Quer progressos tere- mos feito? Seja imaginativo. O que alega ele e como o justifica? Lynch, John A. Fogg De um ponto de vista abstracto, podemos pensar que o facto de algumas redes sociais terem mais sucesso serem mais utilizadas do que outras ex: Instale em segundos!
E o site Ask Jeeves exemplifica muito bem como um site www. Drunk Driving Simulator. Quer Bogost, quer Frasca utilizam conceitos distintos. Bogost Como escreve Bogost E para adquirir mais terras de pasto, vai o jogador decidir subornar o governo e as autoridades?
Como explica Bogost, em The Rhetoric of Videogames Detecta algum elemento persuasivo? Rhetoric Online: Pode mesmo assumir uma forma argumentativa: Em A systematic theory of argumentation: Raros e curtos? Para Saber mais: Racionalidade Argumenta- tiva. Rhetoric and argumen- tation in the beginning of the XXIst Century. A Arte de Argumentar. Albaladejo, T. Olza, O. Casado-Velarde Eds. Language use in the public sphere: Methodological perspective and empirical applications Bern; Oxford: Peter Lang, pp.
INCM, Barthes, Roland. Bitzer, Lloyd F. Bogost, Ian. Persuasive Games: The Expressive Power of Videogames. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. In The Ecology of Games: Connecting Youth, Games, and Learning. Katie Salen.
The John D. The MIT Press, , pp. Booth, Wayne C. The Quest for Effective Communication. Blair J. Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation: Selected Papers, London, Springer. Breton, Phillipe Breton, Philippe, Gauthier, Gilles Forms and functions.
The Journal of Communication, 23, pp. Burke, Kenneth A Rhetoric of Motives. University of California Press.
Cardoso e Cunha, Tito Lisboa, Livros Horizonte. Cardoso e Cunha, Tito. Crick, Nathan Walter de Gruyter. Eemeren, F. A systematic theory of argumentation: The pragma-dialectical approach. Cambridge University Press. Ferguson, Kennan Livros Labcom, , pp. Livros LabCom, p. Fogg, B. Persuasive Technology. Foss, Sonja K. Toward a Transformation of Rhetorical Theory. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp.
Foucault, Michel A Ordem do Discurso. Introduction to Ludology. Wolf and Bernard Perron. New York: Routledge, pp. Gail, Tom, and Eves, Annmarie A Rhetoric of Silence. Southern Illinois University Press.
Methuen Hamilton, Clive, Maddison, Sarah eds. Silencing Dissent: Isocrates, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The essential guide to rhetoric. Roberts , Designing Visual Language: Strategies for Professional Communicators. Allyn and Bacon. Krebs, Ronald R. Lanham, R. PDF Formatted 8. Kind it though you have! Is that this story impact the ereaders outlook? Of courses yes. This book gives the readers many references and knowledge that bring positive influence in the future.
It gives the readers good spirit. Although the content of this book aredifficult to be done in the real life, but it is still give good idea.
It makes the readers feel enjoy and still positive thinking. Finally, it is the Rhetoric , too, that informs us about the cognitive features of language and style. But the evidence for the position of this dialogue is too tenuous to support such strong conclusions: Cicero seems to use this collection itself, or at least a secondary source relying on it, as his main historical source when he gives a short survey of the history of pre-Aristotelian rhetoric in his Brutus 46— Whereas most modern authors agree that at least the core of Rhet.
III are not mentioned in the agenda of Rhet. The conceptual link between Rhet. III is not given until the very last sentence of the second book. It is quite understandable that the authenticity of this ad hoc composition has been questioned: Regardless of such doubts, the systematic idea that links the two heterogeneous parts of the Rhetoric does not at all seem to be unreasonable: The chronological fixing of the Rhetoric has turned out to be a delicate matter.
At least the core of Rhet. It is true that the Rhetoric refers to historical events that fall in the time of Aristotle's exile and his second stay in Athens, but most of them can be found in the chapters II. Most striking are the affinities to the also early Topics ; if, as it is widely agreed, the Topics represents a pre-syllogistic state of Aristotelian logic, the same is true of the Rhetoric: The structure of Rhet. The first division consists in the distinction among the three means of persuasion: The second tripartite division concerns the three species of public speech.
The speech that takes place in the assembly is defined as the deliberative species. In this rhetorical species, the speaker either advises the audience to do something or warns against doing something. Accordingly, the audience has to judge things that are going to happen in the future, and they have to decide whether these future events are good or bad for the polis, whether they will cause advantage or harm.
The speech that takes place before a court is defined as the judicial species. The speaker either accuses somebody or defends herself or someone else. Naturally, this kind of speech treats things that happened in the past.
The audience or rather jury has to judge whether a past event was just or unjust, i. While the deliberative and judicial species have their context in a controversial situation in which the listener has to decide in favor of one of two opposing parties, the third species does not aim at such a decision: The first book of the Rhetoric treats the three species in succession. These chapters are understood as contributing to the argumentative mode of persuasion or—more precisely—to that part of argumentative persuasion that is specific to the respective species of persuasion.
The second part of the argumentative persuasion that is common to all three species of rhetorical speech is treated in the chapters II. The second means of persuasion, which works by evoking the emotions of the audience, is described in the chapters II.
Though the following chapters II. The underlying theory of this means of persuasion is elaborated in a few lines of chapter II. The aforementioned chapters II. Why the chapters on the argumentative means of persuasion are separated by the treatment of emotions and character in II.
Rhetoric III. Aristotle stresses that rhetoric is closely related to dialectic. He offers several formulas to describe this affinity between the two disciplines: In saying that rhetoric is a counterpart to dialectic, Aristotle obviously alludes to Plato's Gorgias bff.
This analogy between rhetoric and dialectic can be substantiated by several common features of both disciplines:. The analogy to dialectic has important implications for the status of rhetoric. However, though dialectic has no definite subject, it is easy to see that it nevertheless rests on a method, because dialectic has to grasp the reason why some arguments are valid and others are not.
Now, if rhetoric is nothing but the counterpart to dialectic in the domain of public speech, it must be grounded in an investigation of what is persuasive and what is not, and this, in turn, qualifies rhetoric as an art.
Further, it is central to both disciplines that they deal with arguments from accepted premises. Hence the rhetorician who wants to persuade by arguments or rhetorical proofs can adapt most of the dialectical equipment. Nevertheless, persuasion that takes place before a public audience is not only a matter of arguments and proofs, but also of credibility and emotional attitudes.
This is why there are also remarkable differences between the two disciplines:. Aristotle defines the rhetorician as someone who is always able to see what is persuasive Topics VI. Correspondingly, rhetoric is defined as the ability to see what is possibly persuasive in every given case Rhet.
This is not to say that the rhetorician will be able to convince under all circumstances. Rather he is in a situation similar to that of the physician: Similarly, the rhetorician has a complete grasp of his method, if he discovers the available means of persuasion, though he is not able to convince everybody. Aristotelian rhetoric as such is a neutral tool that can be used by persons of virtuous or depraved character.
This capacity can be used for good or bad purposes; it can cause great benefits as well as great harms. There is no doubt that Aristotle himself regards his system of rhetoric as something useful, but the good purposes for which rhetoric is useful do not define the rhetorical capacity as such.
Thus, Aristotle does not hesitate to concede on the one hand that his art of rhetoric can be misused. But on the other hand he tones down the risk of misuse by stressing several factors: Generally, it is true of all goods, except virtue, that they can be misused. Secondly, using rhetoric of the Aristotelian style, it is easier to convince of the just and good than of their opposites. Finally, the risk of misuse is compensated by the benefits that can be accomplished by rhetoric of the Aristotelian style.
It could still be objected that rhetoric is only useful for those who want to outwit their audience and conceal their real aims, since someone who just wants to communicate the truth could be straightforward and would not need rhetorical tools.
This, however, is not Aristotle's point of view: Even those who just try to establish what is just and true need the help of rhetoric when they are faced with a public audience. Aristotle tells us that it is impossible to teach such an audience, even if the speaker had the most exact knowledge of the subject.
Obviously he thinks that the audience of a public speech consists of ordinary people who are not able to follow an exact proof based on the principles of a science.
Further, such an audience can easily be distracted by factors that do not pertain to the subject at all; sometimes they are receptive to flattery or just try to increase their own advantage. And this situation becomes even worse if the constitution, the laws, and the rhetorical habits in a city are bad. Finally, most of the topics that are usually discussed in public speeches do not allow of exact knowledge, but leave room for doubt; especially in such cases it is important that the speaker seems to be a credible person and that the audience is in a sympathetic mood.
For all those reasons, affecting the decisions of juries and assemblies is a matter of persuasiveness, not of knowledge. It is true that some people manage to be persuasive either at random or by habit, but it is rhetoric that gives us a method to discover all means of persuasion on any topic whatsoever. Aristotle joins Plato in criticizing contemporary manuals of rhetoric.
But how does he manage to distinguish his own project from the criticized manuals? The general idea seems to be this: Previous theorists of rhetoric gave most of their attention to methods outside the subject; they taught how to slander, how to arouse emotions in the audience, or how to distract the attention of the hearers from the subject.
This style of rhetoric promotes a situation in which juries and assemblies no longer form rational judgments about the given issues, but surrender to the litigants.
Aristotelian rhetoric is different in this respect: Since people are most strongly convinced when they suppose that something has been proven Rhet. In Aristotle's view an orator will be even more successful when he just picks up the convincing aspects of a given issue, thereby using commonly-held opinions as premises.
Since people have a natural disposition for the true Rhet. Of course, Aristotle's rhetoric covers non-argumentative tools of persuasion as well. It is understandable that several interpreters found an insoluble tension between the argumentative means of pertinent rhetoric and non-argumentative tools that aim at what is outside the subject. It does not seem, however, that Aristotle himself saw a major conflict between these diverse tools of persuasion—presumably for the following reasons: Thus, it is not surprising that there are even passages that regard the non-argumentative tools as a sort of accidental contribution to the process of persuasion, which essentially proceeds in the manner of dialectic cp.
His point seems to be that the argumentative method becomes less effective, the worse the condition of the audience is. This again is to say that it is due to the badness of the audience when his rhetoric includes aspects that are not in line with the idea of argumentative and pertinent rhetoric. The prologue of a speech, for example, was traditionally used for appeals to the listener, but it can also be used to set out the issue of the speech, thus contributing to its clearness.
Similarly, the epilogue has traditionally been used to arouse emotions like pity or anger; but as soon as the epilogue recalls the conclusions reached, it will make the speech more understandable.
The systematical core of Aristotle's Rhetoric is the doctrine that there are three technical means of persuasion. Further, methodical persuasion must rest on a complete analysis of what it means to be persuasive. A speech consists of three things: It seems that this is why only three technical means of persuasion are possible: Technical means of persuasion are either a in the character of the speaker, or b in the emotional state of the hearer, or c in the argument logos itself.
If the speaker appears to be credible, the audience will form the second-order judgment that propositions put forward by the credible speaker are true or acceptable. This is especially important in cases where there is no exact knowledge but room for doubt.
But how does the speaker manage to appear a credible person? Again, if he displayed i without ii and iii , the audience could doubt whether the aims of the speaker are good.
Finally, if he displayed i and ii without iii , the audience could still doubt whether the speaker gives the best suggestion, though he knows what it is. But if he displays all of them, Aristotle concludes, it cannot rationally be doubted that his suggestions are credible. It must be stressed that the speaker must accomplish these effects by what he says; it is not necessary that he is actually virtuous: Thus, the orator has to arouse emotions exactly because emotions have the power to modify our judgments: Many interpreters writing on the rhetorical emotions were misled by the role of the emotions in Aristotle's ethics: Thesis i is false for the simple reason that the aim of rhetorical persuasion is a certain judgment krisis , not an action or practical decision prohairesis.
How is it possible for the orator to bring the audience to a certain emotion? Aristotle's technique essentially rests on the knowledge of the definition of every significant emotion. According to such a definition, someone who believes that he has suffered a slight from a person who is not entitled to do so, etc.
If we take such a definition for granted, it is possible to deduce circumstances in which a person will most probably be angry; for example, we can deduce i in what state of mind people are angry and ii against whom they are angry and iii for what sorts of reason. Aristotle deduces these three factors for several emotions in the chapters II. With this equipment, the orator will be able, for example, to highlight such characteristics of a case as are likely to provoke anger in the audience.
In comparison with the tricks of former rhetoricians, this method of arousing emotions has a striking advantage: The orator who wants to arouse emotions must not even speak outside the subject; it is sufficient to detect aspects of a given subject that are causally connected with the intended emotion.
For Aristotle, there are two species of arguments: A deduction sullogismos is an argument in which, certain things having been supposed, something different from the suppositions results of necessity through them Topics I. The inductive argument in rhetoric is the example paradeigma ; unlike other inductive arguments, it does not proceed from many particular cases to one universal case, but from one particular to a similar particular if both particulars fall under the same genus Rhet.
At first glance, this seems to be inconsistent, since a non-necessary inference is no longer a deduction. If the former interpretation is true, then Aristotle concedes in the very definition of the enthymeme that some enthymemes are not deductive.
But if the latter interpretation which has a parallel in An. For Aristotle, an enthymeme is what has the function of a proof or demonstration in the domain of public speech, since a demonstration is a kind of sullogismos and the enthymeme is said to be a sullogismos too.
In general, Aristotle regards deductive arguments as a set of sentences in which some sentences are premises and one is the conclusion, and the inference from the premises to the conclusion is guaranteed by the premises alone. Since enthymemes in the proper sense are expected to be deductive arguments, the minimal requirement for the formulation of enthymemes is that they have to display the premise-conclusion structure of deductive arguments.
This is why enthymemes have to include a statement as well as a kind of reason for the given statement. Examples of the former, conditional type are: The reason why the enthymeme, as the rhetorical kind of proof or demonstration, should be regarded as central to the rhetorical process of persuasion is that we are most easily persuaded when we think that something has been demonstrated.
Hence, the basic idea of a rhetorical demonstration seems to be this: In order to make a target group believe that q , the orator must first select a sentence p or some sentences p 1 … p n that are already accepted by the target group; secondly he has to show that q can be derived from p or p 1 … p n , using p or p 1 … p n as premises.
Given that the target persons form their beliefs in accordance with rational standards, they will accept q as soon as they understand that q can be demonstrated on the basis of their own opinions. Consequently, the construction of enthymemes is primarily a matter of deducing from accepted opinions endoxa.
Of course, it is also possible to use premises that are not commonly accepted by themselves, but can be derived from commonly accepted opinions; other premises are only accepted since the speaker is held to be credible; still other enthymemes are built from signs: That a deduction is made from accepted opinions—as opposed to deductions from first and true sentences or principles—is the defining feature of dialectical argumentation in the Aristotelian sense.
Thus, the formulation of enthymemes is a matter of dialectic, and the dialectician has the competence that is needed for the construction of enthymemes. Nevertheless, this expectation is somehow misled: However, in the rhetorical context there are two factors that the dialectician has to keep in mind if she wants to become a rhetorician too, and if the dialectical argument is to become a successful enthymeme.